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Abstract
Mindfulness plays a prominent role in traditional and modern Buddhist meditation prac-
tice. This paper examines the theoretical background of the concept of mindfulness (sati) 
as presented in the early Buddhist sources, recorded in Theravāda Buddhism. It outlines 
the definitions and presentations of mindfulness (sati) in the Pāli Canon and examines 
how it is embedded within the fundamental models of Buddhist discourse. Then it in-
vestigates mindfulness within the philosophical framework of the Abhidhamma, where it 
is presented as one of the mental factors (cetasika) involved in cognitive processes; it out-
lines its characteristics, functions, conditions, and compatibility with other mental factors, 
which occur as components within the interdependent processes of consciousness (citta). 
The article shows how mindfulness has a special role as a component on the Buddhist 
path to liberation from suffering (dukkha) and how it is integrated within the soteriolog-
ical and ethical goals of Buddhist practice. 
Keywords: mindfulness, sati, early Buddhism, ethics and Buddhist meditation, Buddhist 
psychology
Izvleček
Čuječnost ima pomembno mesto v tradicionalni in moderni budistični meditaciji. Prispe-
vek preučuje teoretične osnove in izhodišča koncepta čuječnosti (sati) v zgodnjih bud-
ističnih virih theravādskega budizma. Najprej opiše definicije in predstavitve čuječnos-
ti (sati) v pālijskih kanoničnih besedilih in prikaže, da je čuječnost sestavni del vseh 
glavnih modelov budističnega diskurza. Nato raziskuje čuječnost v filozofskem okviru 
Abhidhamme, kjer je predstavljena kot eden od mentalnih dejavnikov (cetasika), udeleženih 
v kognicijskih procesih, ter oriše njene glavne značilnosti, funkcije in povezave z drugimi, 
soodvisnimi komponentami kognicije (citta). Prispevek prikaže, na kakšen način je ču-
ječnost integralni del soterioloških in etičnih ciljev budistične prakse, ki naj bi prepeljala 
do osvoboditve od trpljenja in nezadovoljivosti bivanja (dukkha). 
Ključne besede: čuječnost, sati, zgodnji budizem, etika in budistična meditacija, budis-
tična psihologija
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Defining Mindfulness
The word “mindfulness” is the English translation of the Pāli term sati1 (San-
skrit smr �ti), which refers to an important concept in Buddhist doctrine and a 
central component of Buddhist meditation. The term was rendered into Eng-
lish as mindfulness in the 1880s, firstly introduced by T. W. Rhys Davids in his 
translations of the Pāli Canonical texts (Gethin 2011, 263–4). Since then, the 
term has become well established in English translations of Buddhist literature 
and, later on, started to refer primarily to a particular meditation method. The 
Pāli term sati is attested in a range of meanings such as “memory, recollec-
tion, recognition, mindfulness, wakefulness, alertness.”2 Although the Sanskrit 
equivalent smr �ti is most commonly translated as “memory,”3 it seems that al-
ready in the earliest Vedic texts the term encompassed a range of connotations 
similar to those in Buddhist contexts (i.e., “memory, attention, awareness”), 
as convincingly argued by Klaus (1992, 77–86). The semantic scope of this 
term is rather wide and, consequently, its English translation has not been fully 
standardised.4 
In the Pāli Buddhist Canon, the term sati occasionally refers to remembering 
past events5 and, more often, in meditation contexts, to the recollection (anus-
sati) of wholesome objects such as the qualities of the Buddha.6 However, most 
frequently, sati refers to meditative awareness, rendered into English as “mind-
fulness”, often attested in conjunction with the term “clear comprehension” (sam-
pajañña). The predominant occurrences of sati in meditation contexts reflect the 
main aims of the Buddhist teachings presented in the Pāli Canon, which largely 
focus on the soteriological goals to be achieved through ethical and meditative 
training; hence, the Buddhist doctrine is not much concerned with the mundane 
events or their remembrance. Although the conditions for recollective memory 
and mindful awareness are linked within the semantic range of sati, as discussed 
1 Interpretations of mindfulness that have evolved in modern Buddhism very frequently refer back 
to Theravāda sources. The overview of the concept of mindfulness in this article therefore draws 
from the Theravāda Buddhist canon, with the technical terms for mindfulness and the related con-
cepts given in Pāli. 
2 Pāli sati is rendered in PED (s.v.) into English as “memory, recognition, wakefulness, mindfulness, 
alertness”.
3 Sanskrit smr �ti is translated in MW (s.v.) as “remembrance, reminiscence, calling to mind, memory”.
4 A good overview of the concept of memory in different Buddhist textual traditions and various 
contexts is given in Gyatso (1992).
5 AN V 14 5.
6 E.g., the recollections (anussati) listed in the Visuddhimagga (Vism 197–228) include remembering 
of the qualities of the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Saṅgha, virtues, generosity and deities.
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by several scholars (Cox 1992, 67–108), sati occurs in the Pāli Canon primarily 
as a meditational term. 
In the Pāli Canon, sati is often described as a particular kind of remembering, 
indicating non-forgetfulness, wakefulness, presence; for example, in the Dham-
masaṅgaṇi, the faculty of mindfulness (satindriyam) is defined as: »… remem-
bering, recollection, mindfulness as memory, bearing in mind, not wobbling, not 
forgetting; mindfulness as faculty, power, right mindfulness ...«.7
Non-forgetfulness refers to mindful attention towards meditation objects from 
an ethical perspective—as to whether the objects are wholesome or not; hence, 
Gethin (2011, 265) describes sati as a kind of “ethical intuition”. The function of 
ethical watchfulness of sati is illustrated in many texts through similes such as the 
well-known comparison of mindfulness to a gatekeeper who is guarding the city’s 
six gates (representing the six senses) from strangers (i.e. unwholesome mental 
states).8 In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa summarises the characteristics and 
functions of mindfulness in the following passage: 
By [mindfulness] they remember (saranti), or it remembers by itself, or 
it is just only remembering (saraṇa), this is mindfulness (sati). Its char-
acteristic is not wobbling (apilāpana), its function is non-confusion, it is 
manifested as guarding, or as facing the object. Its proximate cause is firm 
perception (thirasaññā), or its proximate cause is the foundation of mind-
fulness of the body, and so on (kāyādisatipat�t�hāna). Because it is firmly 
supported, it should be viewed as a pillar, or as a gate-keeper because it 
guards the eye-door, and so on.9
This definition and characterisation of mindfulness has often served as a founda-
tion for its interpretations in modern Buddhism from the late nineteenth century 
onwards, particularly in Burmese Buddhism, where meditation was positioned at 
the centre of Buddhist teachings and thus provided the grounds and conditions 
for the subsequent popularisation and secularisation of mindfulness in the late 
twentieth century (Braun 2013).
7 Dhs 11; 16: … anussati pat�issati sati saraṇatā dhāraṇatā apilāpanatā asammussanatā sati satindriyam� 
sati balam� sammāsati …. All translations from Pāli into English are by the author of this paper (Cf. 
Rhys Davids 2012, 14).
8 SN IV 194.
9 Vism 464: Saranti tāya, sayam� vā sarati, saraṇamattam eva vā, esā ti sati. Sā apilāpanalakkhaṇā, 
asammoharasā, ārakkhapaccupat�t�hānā, visayābhimukhabhāvapaccupat�t�hānā vā; thirasaññāpadat�t�hānā, 
kāyādisatipat�t�hānapadat�t�hānā vā. Ārammaṇe dal�hapatit�t�hitattā pana esikā viya, cakkhudvārādirak-
khaṇato dovāriko viya ca dat�t�habbā. (Cf. Ñāṇamoli 1994, 524)
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As indicted by Buddhaghosa in the passage above, mindfulness is a wakeful, ethical 
guarding, a gate-keeper for the cognitive processes arising through the six senses, 
and thus serves as a foundation for meditative cultivation (bhāvanā). Its proximate 
cause or condition are the four foundations of mindfulness, the four satipat�t�hānas. 
10 There are several texts in the Tipit�aka11 that describe or prescribe the practise of 
the four satipat�t�hānas; the longest and most detailed ones are the two versions of 
the Satipat�t�hānasutta.12 In the beginning of this sutta mindfulness is clearly situated 
as a component of meditation training, prescribing how a monk should practice it:
A monk abides contemplating the body as a body, diligent (ātāpī), clear-
ly comprehending (sampajāno) and mindful (satimā), having abandoned 
desires and discontent (vineyya abhijjhādomanassam�) regarding the world 
(loke).13
The same formula is repeated for contemplation of the body (kāya), feelings (ve-
danā), the mind (citta), and mental phenomena (dhamma). Mindfulness is to be 
practiced in conjunction with other qualities: the meditator needs sustainable ef-
fort or diligence (ātāpī), explained in the Buddhaghosa’s commentary, the Papañ-
casūdanī, as the energy required to burn defilements (kilesa).14 Another quality to 
accompany mindfulness is clear comprehension (sampajañña), which is presented 
in several passages in the canonical texts; it functions as an understanding that 
conditions cultivation of wholesome qualities and abandons those that are un-
wholesome.15 In the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, clear comprehension (sampajañña) is defined 
as the faculty of wisdom (paññā), which encompasses understanding, insight, an-
alytical discrimination, wise reflection, etc.16 The practise of the four satipat�t�hānas 
10 Vism 464; the four satipat�t�hānas include mindfulness of the body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), the 
mind (citta) and mental phenomena (dhamma).
11 The following are identified in the Suttapit�aka (by the Digital Pali Reader); AN III 450; DN II 
290–315; MN I 55–63; MN III 111–2; SN V 143, 294–7; Nidd 1 1, 28, 63, 72, 78, 99; 340, 354, 
370, 387; Nidd 2 78, 124, 128.
12 I.e. the Satipat�t�hānasutta in the Majjhima Nikāya (MN I 55–63) and the Mahāsatipat�t�hānasutta in 
the Dīgha Nikāya (DN II 290–315). 
13 MN I 56; DN II 290: ātāpī sampajāno satimā vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassam�.
14 Ps I 244: ātāpīti tīsu bhavesu kilese ātāpetīti ātāpo.
15 AN I 13.
16 Dhs 16: Katamam� tasmim samaye sampajaññam� hoti? Yā tasmim� samaye paññā pajānanā vicayo 
pavicayo dhammavicayo sallakkhaṇā upalakkhaṇā paccupalakkhaṇā paṇd�iccam� kosallam� nepuññam� ve-
bhavyā cintā upaparikkhā bhūrī medhā pariṇāyikā vipassanā sampajaññam� patodo paññā paññindri-
yam� paññābalam� paññāsattham� paññāpāsādo paññā-āloko paññā-obhāso paññāpajjoto paññāratanam� 
amoho dhammavicayo sammādit�t�hi—idam� tasmim� samaye sampajaññam� hoti. The same definition is 
given in Dhs 11 for paññindriyam�. (Cf. Rhys Davids 2012, 16)
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also requires that the meditator has overcome (vineyya) desires and discontent (ab-
hijjhādomanassam�) concerning the world (loke). The world refers to the body, the 
feelings, the mind and phenomena,17 or in other words, according to the Vibhaṅga, 
the five aggregates of clinging which represent the world of experience.18 
Thus, mindfulness (sati) is not practised on its own but in conjunction with other 
qualities, such as wisdom, and requires (temporary) absence of desire and aversion. 
As will be discussed later on, sati is presented in the Pāli Abhidhamma as one of 
the universal wholesome or ethical (kusala) mental components (cetasika) and, 
consequently, it can occur only in the company of other wholesome components. 
Hence, it is not compatible with aversion, desire, delusion and other unwholesome 
or ethically unskilful mental components (akusala cetasika). Mindfulness, togeth-
er with other components, can see and understand unwholesome conditions for 
objects that may arise; however, the process of cognition itself of the object is 
wholesome when mindfulness is present. Thus in the practise of the four sati-
pat�t�hānas the focus is not only on what is experienced (although the object itself 
is conditioned and conditioning other components within cognitive processes) 
but primarily on how the object is cognised, which depends on the cetasikas ac-
companying cognition: if mindfulness is present in the cognition (citta), then the 
cognition itself is wholesome, ethical and provides the necessary conditions for 
knowledge, clear comprehension (sampajañña) or wisdom (paññā) to arise. 
Mindfulness is firmly embedded and integrated within the doctrinal structure of 
the Pāli Canon, which is underpinned by the fundamental premise that non-sat-
isfactoriness and suffering (dukkha) of human existence—as a response to life 
experiences—can be completely overcome or transcended through ethical and 
meditation training, leading to insight or wisdom (paññā) and, ultimately, to nib-
bāna. The term paññā is usually translated into English as wisdom, intuitive un-
derstanding, or an insight into the nature (i.e. impermanence, non-satisfactoriness 
and non-self ) and conditionality of all mental and physical phenomena com-
prising human experience. It is presented as a component in cognitive processes 
which directly sees the experiences as a flow of momentary, interlinked and im-
personal phenomena and conditions. It is described as discriminative knowledge, 
intuitive intelligence, absence of delusions, right view,19 and is often linked to or 
17 Ps I 244: loketi tasmim�yeva kāye. kāyo hi idha lujjanapalujjanat�t�hena lokoti adhippeto.
18 Vibh 195: pañca pi upādānakkhandhā loko: ayam� vuccati loko.
19 Dhs 11: katamam� tasmim� samaye paññindriyam� hoti? yā tasmim� samaye paññā pajānanā vicayo pavic-
ayo dhammavicayo sallakkhaṇā upalakkhaṇā paccupalakkhaṇā paṇd�iccam� kosallam� nepuññam� vebhabyā 
cintā upaparikkhā bhūrī medhā pariṇāyikā vipassanā sampajaññam� patodo paññā paññindriyam� 
paññābalam� paññāsattham� paññāpāsādo paññāāloko paññāobhāso paññāpajjoto paññāratanam� amoho 
dhammavicayo sammādit�t�hi — idam� tasmim� samaye paññindriyam� hoti (Cf. Dhs 12; 13; 14). 
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equated with clear comprehension (sampajañña).20 In the Visuddhimagga the term 
paññā is explained in the following way:
Paññā is insight knowledge (vipassanāñāṇam�), associated with whole-
some cognition (kusalacitta) … it is knowing (jānana) which is different 
from perceiving (sañjānana) and cognizing (vijānana) ... Paññā knows 
the object, bringing up understanding of the characteristics (lakkhaṇapa-
t�ivedha).21 (Vism XIV, 3)22 
The attribute kusala, usually rendered into English as “wholesome, skilful, good, 
right”,23 refers here to those components involved in cognitive processes that are 
skilful, ethically wholesome or appropriate for the path to liberation from suf-
fering (dukkha). All such ethical or wholesome states, free from delusion, desire 
and aversion, are viewed as states of mental health,24 which is presented as the 
foundation and necessary condition for knowledge or insight to arise. According 
to the Abhidhamma, wisdom always arises in conjunction with mindfulness (sati), 
which can in turn only occur in the “good company” of other ethical components 
(kusalacetasika) of cognition (citta).
To summarise, mindfulness is presented in the Pāli Canon in conjunction with 
several other mental components or qualities that are to be cultivated together 
in meditative training, aiming to develop wisdom and liberation from suffering. 
Although this paper does not aim to discuss or compare Buddhist presentations 
of mindfulness with its contemporary interpretations in new secular contexts,25 it 
will briefly touch upon some relevant issues. It may be argued that the presenta-
tion of mindfulness in the Buddhist context is significantly different—in its defi-
nition, aims, characteristics, functions and the entire underpinning discourse—
from its modern definitions and secular applications. In the new secular contexts, 
mindfulness is to a large extent perceived as a therapeutic tool, helpful for a wide 
20 Dhs 16.
21 Here the text refers to the three characteristics (tilakkhaṇa): impermanence (anicca), non-satisfac-
toriness (dukkha) and non-self (anattā).
22 Vism 436–7: Kusalacittasampayuttam� vipassanāñāṇam� paññā.... Sañjānana-vijānanākāravisit�t�ham� 
nānappakārato jānanam�. ... Paññā vuttanaya-vasena ārammaṇañ ca jānāti, lakkhaṇapat �ivedhañ ca 
pāpeti.
23 PED, s.v.
24 As 62–63: kilesāturatāya kilesagelaññassa ca kilesabyādhino abhāvena ārogyat�t�hena kusalam� veditab-
bam� … kilesavajjassa pana kilesadosassa kilesadarathassa ca abhāvā anavajjat�t�hena kusalam�. (Cf. Tin 
2013, 83).
25 A number of papers has been published in the last decades, exploring modern interpretations of 
mindfulness; e.g., Sharf 1995; Gethin 2011; Kirmayer 2015; Ditrich 2016.
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spectrum of problems and disorders, or for enhancing general well-being. It is 
typically defined in its new functions as “the awareness that emerges through 
paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgementally” 
(Kabat-Zinn 2003, 145). The common denominator of the new definitions of 
mindfulness is non-judgemental attention to the present moment. Within the 
Buddhist doctrinal models of cognition, the closest correlative concept for this 
new interpretation of mindfulness would be the term manasikāra, usually ren-
dered into English as “attention”.26 According to the Abhidhamma, manasikāra 
is one of the mental components, present in every moment of cognition (citta); 
it may arise in conjunction with ethically wholesome, unwholesome or neutral 
mental states. In the Visuddhimagga, it is defined as: 
… the maker in the mind (manamhi kāro) … the supporter of the ob-
ject (ārammaṇapat�ipādako), the supporter of cognitive processes (vīthi-
pat�ipādako) and the supporter of apperception (javanapat�ipādako)… Its 
characteristic is directing (sāraṇa), its function is bonding (sam�yojana) 
associated states to the object, its manifestation is facing an object (āram-
maṇābhimukha) and its proximate cause is an object.27 
In the Pāli Canonical texts, attention is presented in two distinct modes: it can be 
skilful, wise attention (yoniso manasikāra) or non-skilful, non-wise attention (ayoni-
so manasikāra). In the context of Buddhist path of ethical and meditational train-
ing, only wise attention is to be cultivated, in conjunction with other wholesome 
components such as mindfulness, whereas unwise attention should be averted from 
and overcome; for example, in the Sabbāsavasutta it is explained that through wise 
attention (yoniso manasikāra) the deepest defilements (āsava) can be extinguished.28
In distinction to modern understanding of mindfulness as paying attention 
non-judgementally, meditation training in the Buddhist teachings does not aim 
to develop attention on its own but only cultivation of skilful, wise attention (yon-
iso manasikāra), i.e. attention that is accompanied by other skilful components of 
cognition, allowing wisdom to be present. In other words, as stated in the Dham-
masaṅgaṇi, skilfulness in attention is equated to “wisdom, understanding, non-de-
lusion, wise discrimination, right view.”29 
26 PED, s.v.
27 Vism 466: Kiriyākāro, manamhi kāro manasikāro … ārammaṇapat �ipādako, vīthipat�ipāda-
ko, javanapat�ipādako ... So sāraṇalakkhaṇo, sampayuttānam� ārammaṇe sam�yojanaraso, āram-
maṇābhimukhabhāvapaccupat�t�hāno, ārammaṇapadat �t�hāno. 
28 MN I 7–2.
29 Dhs 229: Tattha katamā manasikārakusalatā? Yā tāsam� dhātūnam� manasikākusalatā paññā pajānanā 
… amoho dhammavicayo sammādit�t�hi--ayam� vuccati manasikārakusalatā.
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Furthermore, wise attention (yoniso manasikāra) is directly linked to mindfulness 
(sati). For example, in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (Yamaka-Vagga) it is said that when 
wise attention (yoniso manasikāra) is achieved, mindfulness (sati) and clear com-
prehension (sampajañña) are accomplished; these two being accomplished lead 
in turn to sense restraint (indriyasam�vara), which leads to ethical conduct (tīṇi 
sucaritāni), the establishment of the four foundations of mindfulness (cattāro sati-
pat�t�hānā), to seven factors of awakening (satta bojjhaṅgā), and to the knowledge 
and final liberation (vijjāvimutti).30 Thus, definitions, interpretations and practical 
applications of mindfulness (sati) in the Pāli Canon are embedded in all the main 
domains of Buddhist ethical and soteriological discourse. 
Positioning of Mindfulness in the Main Doctrinal Models in the 
Suttapit�aka
Buddhist teachings are succinctly presented through the “four noble truths”, 
which encompass pragmatic, ethical and epistemological aspects of the doctrine.31 
The four truths outline non-satisfactoriness of existence (dukkha), identifying 
craving (taṅhā) as its cause, pronouncing the possibility that one can be complete-
ly liberated from suffering (through nibbāna), and outlining the eightfold path, 
which leads to liberation. The four truths are presented in the Tipit�aka through 
several interrelated models which, from various perspectives, delineate and artic-
ulate Buddhist doctrine; they all situate mindfulness (sati) as one of their integral 
components. 
The first truth defines non-satisfactoriness of existence (dukkha) as a way of re-
sponse to experiences, stemming from ignorance about the impermanent nature 
of all mental and physical phenomena (anicca) and absence of any intrinsic self 
or identity (anattā). In the Dhammacakkappavattanasutta, non-satisfactoriness 
( dukkha) is described as experiences of:
… birth, aging, illness, death; to be connected to unpleasant circum-
stances and separated from pleasant ones; not to get what one wants;
30 AN V 115: yonisomanasikāro paripūro satisampajaññam� paripūreti, satisampajaññam� paripūram� 
indriyasam�varam� paripūreti, indriyasam�varo paripūro tīṇi sucaritāni paripūreti, tīṇi sucaritāni par-
ipūrāni cattāro satipat�t�hāne paripūrenti, cattāro satipat�t�hānā paripūrā satta bojjhaṅge paripūrenti, satta 
bojjhaṅgā paripūrā vijjāvimuttim� paripūrenti.
31 According to the tradition, the Buddha explained the four truths already in the Dhammacakkappa-
vattanasutta (SN V 420–424), which is considered to be his first sermon.
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in short, non-satisfactoriness (dukkha) is clinging to the five aggregates 
(pañcupādānakkhandhā).32 
The five aggregates or five groups of conditions and events, which comprise phys-
ical and mental phenomena of existence, are described as: (1) materiality (rūpa), 
encompassing physical or material components; (2) feelings (vedanā), which 
 occur at every moment of cognition and may be pleasant, unpleasant or neither; 
(3) perception (saññā), which recognises and labels experiences; (4) numerous 
mental formations (saṅkhāra), which arise together with cognition itself and de-
termine how an object is cognised, e.g., with desire, compassion, equanimity, etc.; 
and (5) cognition (viññāṇa), which arises at any of the six sense-doors and knows 
the object of experience.33 The five groups or aggregates (khandha) are comprised 
of interrelated material and mental components participating in the flow of ex-
periences, which we identify with and perceive as a person. They represent the 
most prominent aspects of experience and each component may be an object 
of mindful contemplation. Thus, the Satipat�t�hānasutta describes or prescribes34 
contemplation of impermanence of the five aggregates as an area of mindfulness 
practise, within the section on contemplation of mental phenomena (dhammas).35 
Development of mindfulness of the five aggregates is considered to enhance and 
condition the arising of insight into their impermanent nature (anicca), non-satis-
factoriness (dukkha), and absence of intrinsic self or identity (anattā)—an insight 
which in turn leads to liberation (nibbāna).36
Although there are numerous components involved in cognitive processes,37 one 
is singled out in the context of the second truth about the origination of suffering, 
namely, craving or desire (taṅhā), which is considered to be the cause of non-sat-
isfactoriness or suffering (dukkha). Hence, only through overcoming this craving 
is one liberated from ignorance and, consequently, from suffering. Craving is posi-
tioned as a component in the formula of interdependent origination (pat�iccasam-
uppāda), perhaps the most important model of Buddhist doctrine, discoursed 
32 S V 421: Jāti pi dukkhā jarā pi dukkhā vyādhi pi dukkhā maraṇam pi dukkham� sokaparidevaduk-
khadomanassupāyāsāpi dukkhā appiyehi sampayogo dukkho piyehi vippayogo dukkho yam piccham� na 
labhati tam pi dukkham� sam�khittena pañcupādānakkhandhā pi dukkha.
33 For discourses on the five aggregates, see the Khandhavagga, SN III; English translation by Bodhi 
(2000, 853–983).
34 Scholars have different views as to whether Buddhist texts on meditation are of descriptive or 
prescriptive nature (Cf. Sharf 1995, 228–83).
35 MN I 61; DN II 301–2.
36 SN III 1–5; 16–25.
37 The Abhidhamma lists fifty-two mental components (cetasikas) that can occur in various combina-
tions together with every moment of cognition; for the list of cetasikas, see Bodhi 1993, 79.
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upon in numerous Canonical texts and commentaries, expressing the four truths 
in a dynamic manner.38
The formula of dependent origination (pat�iccasamuppāda) is comprised of the fol-
lowing twelve links in a manner that each conditions the following one: 
(1) ignorance (avijjā) → (2) mental formations (saṅkhāra) → (3) cognition or 
consciousness (viññāṇa) → (4) the mind and the body (nāmarūpa) → (5) sense 
bases (five physical senses and the mind, and their objects) (sal�āyatana) → (6) 
contact with objects or experiences (phassa) → (7) feelings (pleasant, unpleasant 
or neutral) (vedanā) → (8) craving (taṅhā) → (9) clinging (upādāna) → (10) being 
(bhava) → (11) birth (jāti) → (12) aging and death (jarāmaraṇa).39 
This formula describes interlinked conditionality for the arising of suffering 
(dukkha) and rebirth; in reverse order (pat�iloma), it presents the way to libera-
tion from suffering. The formula is not to be interpreted in a linear manner since 
all components are interlinked and interdependent. In the process of cognition, 
consciousness (link 3) which arises every moment, is conditioned by past mental 
formations (link 2), i.e., past conditions and reactions, stemming from ignorance 
(link 1); here, ignorance refers to not knowing that all the phenomena, conditions, 
and processes are impermanent, subject to suffering and without an intrinsic self 
or, in other words, not knowing the four truths.40 The process of cognition takes 
place within the framework of the body and mind (link 4),41 which is repeatedly in 
contact (link 6) through its six senses, with their objects (link 5)42 and experiences, 
which in turn condition the feelings (link 7). Feelings can be pleasant, unpleasant 
or neither, depending on past conditions and responses (link 2) to similar experi-
ences. The first seven links are interpreted as unavoidable results of the past, which 
conditions the experience of the present. 
If mindfulness and clear comprehension are not present in the cognitive process, 
one responds to feelings (link 7) with craving (link 8) to keep pleasant experi-
ences or get rid of the unpleasant ones; or in other words, craving for sensual 
38 For discourses on causation, see the Nidānavagga, SN II 1–133; D II 55–71.
39 SN II 1–2: Katamo ca bhikkhave pat�iccasamuppādo? Avijjāpaccayā bhikkhave saṅkhārā, saṅkhāra-
paccayā viññānam�, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpam�, nāmarūpapaccayā sal�āyatanam�, sal�āyatanapaccayā 
phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇha paccayā upādānam�, upādānapaccayā bhavo, 
bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇam�.
40 SN II 4: Katamā ca bhikkhave avijjā? Yam� kho bhikkhave dukkhe aññāṇam� dukkhasamudaye aññāṇam� 
dukkhanirodhe aññāṇam� dukkhanirodhagāminiyā pat�ipadāya aññāṇam�. Ayam� vuccati bhikkhave 
avijjā.
41 Consciousness (link 3) and the mind and body (link 4) condition and are conditioned by each other 
(cf. DN II 32); the two links represent the five aggregates, discussed earlier in this paper. 
42 The six sense bases include the five physical senses and the mind, and their corresponding objects.
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pleasures, for being and for not being, which is the origin of suffering.43 Craving 
in turn leads to clinging (link 9),44 and consequently, to developing certain ways 
of being or living (link 10), repeated births (link 11), bringing about aging, death, 
and non-satisfactoriness (link 12). This in turn generates further ignorance (link 
1) about the impermanent nature and emptiness of phenomena, creating new 
mental formations (link 2), which condition future experiences. The stronger the 
clinging (link 9), the greater the ignorance (link 1), as well as mental habits and 
reactions (link 2), which condition and perpetuate new responses to experiences 
(links 8–10). 
The aim of the Buddhist praxis can be articulated as a disentanglement from the 
web of interdependent origination. One of the key conditions for the reversal of 
the order of its links is mindfulness, which protects one from responding to con-
tinuously arising feelings (link 7) with craving (link 8) and clinging (link 9). The 
importance of mindfulness of feelings is reflected in the texts on the practise of 
the four foundations of mindfulness (cattāro satipat�t�āna); for example, in the Sati-
pat�t�hānasutta,45 one whole section is dedicated to the contemplation of feelings 
(vedanānupassanā),46 as well as a subsection under contemplation of mental compo-
nents (dhammānupassanā),47 which focuses on the impermanent nature of feelings.
As presented in the formula of dependent origination, mindfulness protects—
by its mere presence—from craving and conditions arising of wisdom (paññā), 
which in turn prevents ignorance (link 1) to arise. Wisdom (paññā) understands 
the feelings “as they are” (yathā bhūtam�), i.e., impermanent, momentary, empty of 
intrinsic identity.48 Since mindfulness and wisdom are mental factors (link 2), by 
their very nature they are not different from any other phenomena or components 
of experience––they are also impermanent, empty, and can be subject to suffering 
when clung to. This insight into the nature of all phenomena leads to the liber-
ation from ignorance (link 1). Complete uprooting of ignorance is presented in 
the third truth as “blowing away” (Pāli nibbāna,49 Sanskrit nirvāṇa), extinction of 
suffering, the possibility of attaining the state of nibbāna, which is unconditioned, 
not subject to change and non-satisfactoriness. 
43 MN I 48–49: kāmataṇhā bhavataṇhā vibhavataṇhā, ayam� vuccat’ āvuso dukkhasamudayo.
44 Four kind of clinging are listed in SN II 3: to sensual pleasures (kāmupādāna); to views (dit�t�hupādā-
na); to rules and rituals (sīlabbatupādāna); and to belief in self (attavādupādāna).
45 MN I 55; DN II 290.
46 MN I 59; DN II 298.
47 MN I 61; DN II 301–2.
48 Cf. Vism 436–7.
49 For discussion on the semantic range of the term nibbāna, see PED (s.v.). 
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According to the fourth truth, this liberation can be achieved by following the 
eightfold path, divided into three interlinked sections: wisdom, ethics and med-
itation. Wisdom (paññā) is presented by two components, right50 understanding 
(sammā dit�t�hi) and right intention (sammā saṅkappa). Here, right understanding 
(sammā dit�t�hi) refers to direct insight into the nature of all phenomena and their 
independent conditionality,51 or, in other words, understanding of the four truths.52 
Right intention (sammā saṅkappa) is a resolve to cultivate wholesome mental 
states, without anger or cruelty, and develop renunciation.53 These two are further 
interlinked with the second group of the eightfold path, which is concerned with 
ethics (sīla), comprising right speech (sammā-vācā), right action (sammā kam-
manta), and right livelihood (sammā ājīva), i.e., it focuses on the speech and way 
of life that are not harmful to oneself or others.54 The ethical components of the 
eightfold path are conditioned as well as conditioning the first two (paññā) and 
the last three, concerned with meditation practice (samādhi).
The meditation section comprises: right effort (sammā vāyāma) to develop and 
maintain ethical (kusala) mental states, and avoid and undercut non-ethical ones 
(akusala);55 right mindfulness (sammā sati); and right concentration (sammā samā-
dhi), which focuses on a chosen object of contemplation, leading to deep states 
of absorption (jhāna).56 As it was discussed above, right mindfulness (sammā sati) 
is defined as ethical attention directed to the ever-changing flow of interrelated 
physical and mental phenomena or events.57 
Among the various structural representations of the Buddhist teaching, one of 
the most pragmatic ones, focusing on mindfulness, is the model of the four 
50 PED (s.v.) gives the following English equivalents for the Pāli term sammā “thoroughly, properly, 
rightly, in the right way, perfectly”; in the context of the eightfold path it refers to the development 
of its components “appropriately”—for achieving liberation from non-satisfactoriness or suffering 
(dukkha). 
51 MN I 46–55.
52 Vibh 235: Dukkhe ñāṇam� dukkhasamudaye ñāṇam� dukkhanirodhe ñāṇam� dukkhanirodhagāminiyā 
pat�ipadāya ñāṇam�: ayam� vuccati sammādit�t�hi.
53 Vibh 235: Nekkhammasaṅkappo, avyāpādasaṅkappo, avihim�sāsaṅkappo: ayam� vuccati sammāsaṅkappo.
54 Vibh 235: Musāvādā veramaṇī, pisuṇāya vācāya veramaṇī, pharusāya vācāya veramaṇī, samphap-
palāpā veramaṇā: ayam� vuccati sammāvācā. Pāṇātipātā1 veramaṇī, adinnādānā veramaṇī, kāmesu 
micchācārā veramaṇī: ayam� vuccati sammākammanto. Idha ariyasāvako micchā-ājīvam� pahāya sam-
mā-ājīvena jīvitam� kappeti: ayam� vuccati sammā-ājīvo.
55 Vibh 235: idha bhikkhu anuppannānam� pāpakānam� akusalānam� dhammānam� anuppādāya chandam� 
janeti vāyamati vīriyam� ārabhati cittam� paggaṇhāti padahati … vāyamati vīriyam� ārabhati cittam� 
paggaṇhāti padahati.
56 Vibh 236.
57 Ibid.
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foundations of mindfulness (cattāro satipat�t�āna), recorded in several texts of the 
Tipit�aka.58 As already mentioned above, the most well-known among them, 
positioned in modern Buddhism as the ur-text on mindfulness, is the Sati-
pat�t�hānasutta—a brief, succinct outline of the main aspects, areas and modes 
of mindfulness practise. The four satipat�t�hānas articulate, describe or prescribe 
mindful contemplation in four areas: the body (kāya), feelings (vedanā), cogni-
tion (citta), and mental components (dhamma). The sequence of the four areas 
may indicate that the practise of mindfulness starts with the body, i.e. to a large 
extent at the conceptual level, and ends with the contemplation of dhammas at a 
non-conceptual level; although, as often underlined by modern scholars, all four 
areas are interlinked and may occur alternatively as objects of mindful practise 
(Anālayo 2006, 23–26). The last section of the Satipat�t�hānasutta outlines mind-
fulness of dhammas, considered in the Abhidhammic analysis to be the funda-
mental components of experience (Nyanatiloka 2008, 244–6); however, the texts 
on the four satipat�t�hānas do not list all dhammas that are listed and discussed in 
the Abhidhamma, but focus only on those that seem to be the most relevant or 
pivotal for the development of the awakening factors, facilitating the awaken-
ing. The presentation and structure of the four satipat�t�hānas is interrelated and 
linked to the other main models of Buddhist teachings (i.e. the five aggregates, 
the formula of interdependent origination, the four truths), which are included 
in this sutta as objects of mindfulness, especially in the section on contemplation 
of mental components (dhammas).59 
Mindfulness in the Abhidhammapit�aka
In the Abhidhammapit�aka, a collection of texts usually dated in the third century 
BCE, the Buddhist doctrine is systematized and articulated and, unlike in the 
Suttapit�aka, without the background narrative or references to historical context 
(Gethin 1998, 48). The Abhidhamma texts are concerned with the fundamental 
structure of Buddhist teachings, attempting to identify a “deep structure” of 
human experience. In this endeavour, the Abhidhamma follows, at least to some 
degree, structural models developed by the ancient Indian culture probably sev-
eral centuries earlier, most notably in linguistics, such as the Pāṇini’s As�t�ādhyāyī, 
a kind of structural-generative grammar, which establishes the fundamental 
(analytical and dynamic) structure of Sanskrit for description and generation 
58 DN II 290–315; MN I 55–63; MN III 111–112; SN V 143, 294–297; AN III 450; Nidd1 1, 28, 
63, 72, 78, 99; 340, 354, 370, 387; Nidd2 78, 124, 128; cf. Anālayo 2006, 28–30.
59 E.g., mindful contemplation of the five aggregates (pañcakkhandha), twelve sense-spheres (sal�āyata-
na), seven factors of awakening (bojjhaṅga), four truths (catusacca) (DN II 301–13; MN I 61–63).
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of the language in its many aspects and modes of expression. Similarly, the 
Abhidhamma texts systematically present the structure of Buddhist teachings, 
define key concepts and technical terminology, and analyse dynamics of hu-
man experience, always with the fundamental aim of the entire doctrine—the 
liberation from suffering. In terms of Western categories, the Abhidhamma is 
concerned mainly with the areas of philosophy, psychology, and ethics. It is 
a collection of seven texts with rather unclear chronology; according to the 
Buddhist tradition, the oldest text is the Dhammasaṅgaṇi,60 followed by the 
Vibhaṅga and others. However, several modern scholars believe the Vibhaṅga to 
be the oldest (Frauwallner 1971, 69–121; Bronkhorst 1985, 305–20). These two 
texts dedicate considerable attention to mindfulness as one of the components 
of certain cognitive processes.
The Abhidhamma can be portrayed as a systematic articulation of all the main doc-
trinal models discussed above, i.e., the five aggregates (khandha), the formula of 
dependent origination (pat�iccasamuppāda), the eightfold path (at�t�haṅgiko maggo), 
the four foundations of mindfulness (cattāro satipat�t�āna), and others. It aims to 
establish a cognitive structure, comprised of constituents that are the fundamental 
conditions for arising of interdependent momentary phenomena, which generate, 
condition or construct what we call “lived experience”. In a systematic manner, it 
lists, defines and classifies the constituents, events or conditions, called dhammas, 
which underline and participate in the flow of mental and physical phenomena or 
events (Warder 1971, 272–95). It analyses their links and interdependence, and 
presents them as momentary, impermanent, without an intrinsic self or identity. 
Through the analysis of dhammas, the conceptual world is deconstructed; however, 
this analysis does not aim for a theoretical investigation or search for knowledge 
per se, motivated by curiosity, but has a rather distinct pragmatic goal, namely 
that of attaining knowledge or insight that brings deliverance from non-satisfac-
toriness (dukkha), achieved through ethical development and meditation (Bodhi 
1993, 4). The Abhidhamma provides theoretical premises that articulate, through 
well-defined terminology, primarily those constituents or events that are related 
to cultivation of ethics and meditation. Thus, the first book, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, 
introduces in the very first sentence, like many other ancient Indian texts (e.g. 
the Yogasūtra), the entire topic and aim of the Abhidhamma through the ques-
tion: “Which dhammas are wholesome or ethically skilful (kusala)?”61 Then, with 
reference to ethics, the text presents various types of cognition (citta) which are 
listed, classified and analysed; more than half of them refer to higher stages of 
60 Budddhaghosa lists the texts of the Abhidhamma in the following order: Dhammasaṅgaṇi, Vibhaṅ-
ga, Dhātukathā, Puggalapaññatti, Kathāvatthu, Yamaka, and Pat �t�hāna (As 3, 21–23).
61 Dhs 9: katame dhammā kusalā?
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concentration (jhāna), insight and nibbāna, indicating the pivotal role of medita-
tion in the Buddhist path to liberation.62 
Cognitive models, presented in the Abhidhamma, are comprised of very complex, 
interlinked structures which integrate analytic, synthetic and dynamic approach-
es. Here, only those features will be briefly outlined that are relevant for situating 
mindfulness within them. As mentioned earlier, the Abhidhamma represents the 
structure of cognitive processes or experiences from the fundamental, non-con-
ceptual level through four basic categories, which are all called dhammas: cognition 
(citta), mental constituents (cetasika), materiality (rūpa) and nibbāna (Bodhi 1993, 
25). The first three categories are viewed as momentary phenomena, impermanent, 
without intrinsic self, interrelated, conditioned and conditioning, whereas the last 
one, nibbāna, is unconditioned, beyond space and time. From an epistemological 
point of view, dhammas are the fundamental constituents or events of knowing; 
however, direct insight into their nature, links and conditionality can be achieved 
by penetrating beneath the conventional reality. Since dhammas are momentary, 
rapidly changing, and very subtle, they can be noted only when mindfulness and 
wisdom are well developed.
Cognition (citta) is the category characterised by knowing; it is defined as: “that 
which knows its object, which cognizes.”63 At the conventional level cognition or 
consciousness (citta) seems continuous, whereas at the fundamental level (para-
mattha) it is considered to be constituted of a series of momentary cittas, which 
follow and condition one another so rapidly that they create an impression of 
continuity (Bodhi 1993, 29). Cognition (citta) does not occur on its own but al-
ways together with several mental components (cetasika) that determine, label, 
and affect the cognition of an object; in short, they determine how the objects 
of cognition are cognised or experienced. Cognition (citta) cannot occur without 
mental components (cetasika) and vice versa: they always arise together, are inter-
linked, momentary, impermanent, and conditioned; there is no reference point or 
observer outside this interlinked structure which is called lived experience. The 
Abhidhamma lists over fifty different mental constituents (cetasika), which occur 
in various groupings together with each citta, at every moment.64 Not all of them 
are compatible and thus cannot appear in the same group in a given moment 
of cognition; for example, anger or greed cannot occur in a group together with 
mindfulness or compassion. 
62 Dhs 9–133.
63 As 63: Cittanti ārammaṇam� cintetīti cittam� vijānātīti attho.
64 Dhs 9, 75–76; 87; 120.
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The Abhidhamma classifies, from an ethical perspective,65 different types of 
cognition (citta) in relation to the types of accompanying mental components 
(cetasikas) which can be ethically variable, unwholesome or wholesome. 66 Ac-
cording to the Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha, there are thirteen cetasikas that are 
ethically variable, i.e. they can arise together within ethical or non-ethical cittas; 
among these, seven are “universal” cetasikas which arise with every citta.67 The 
non-ethical mental components (akusala cetasikas) arise in various combina-
tions with unwholesome cognition (akusala citta) and are always accompanied 
by unpleasant mental feeling (domanassa); for example, in the moments of un-
ethical cognition (akusala citta) there are always present delusion (moha) and 
restlessness (uddhacca), which can occur in different combinations with greed 
(lobha), conceit (māna), dullness (thīna), confusion (vicikicchā), or anger (dosa), 
envy (macchariya), selfishness (macchariya), etc.68 The largest number of cetasikas 
listed appear with ethical cognition (kusala citta), and mindfulness (sati) is one 
of them, occurring only in the “good company” of other wholesome or ethical 
cetasikas, such as trust (saddhā), understanding of consequences (hiri and ottap-
pa), non-greed (alobha), non-aversion (adosa), mental equilibrium (tatramajjhat-
tatā), peace (passaddhi), lightness (lahutā), gentleness (mudutā), etc. 69 Mindful-
ness is compatible with all other ethical cetasikas, such as compassion (karuṇā), 
sympathetic joy (muditā), and equanimity (upekkhā),70 and incompatible with 
unethical (akusala) ones, such as greed, fear, and aversion. Thus the presence of 
mindfulness indicates and is indicated by other mental constituents (cetasikas) 
that arise with it, such as peace, trust, lightness, etc.
The Abhidhamma presents the processes of cognition as complex, ever-changing 
mental structures, comprised of sequences of rapid, extremely brief moments of 
cognition (citta) that appears in conjunction with many mental constituents (ce-
tasika): these construct what we call lived experience. Mindfulness is one of the 
mental constituents: it arises in conjunction with other wholesome constituents 
65 Therefore the title of first text from the Abhidhamapit�aka, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, is translated by 
Caroline Rhys Davids as A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics (2012).
66 The first book of the Abhidhamma, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi (Dhs), comprises a detailed analysis of 
various types of cognition (citta), classified in reference to the mental components (cetasikas) which 
arise together with that particular type of citta. 
67 The seven “universal” cetasikas are: contact (with an object) (phassa); feeling (vedanā); perception 
(saññā); volition (cetanā); one-pointedness (ekaggatā); life faculty (jīvitindriya); and attention (ma-
nasikāra) (Cf. Bodhi 1993, 79).
68 Dhs 75–87.
69 Dhs 9.
70 Dhs 54–55.
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(cetasikas),71 and acts together with others as a required condition for the occur-
rence of wisdom (pañña), which is an insight into the three characteristics72 of 
all phenomena and processes, leading to liberation from suffering (dukkha), to 
nibbāna.73
As outlined above, in the first book of the Abhidhamma, in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, 
the typology and analysis of cognition (citta) and mental constituents (cetasika) 
are given, followed by the analysis of material components (rūpa) and their 
links with the first two categories.74 The following book, the Vibhaṅga, based 
on the analysis and structure given in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, focuses on the anal-
ysis of the main models of Buddhist doctrine, altogether eighteen in num-
ber, such as the five aggregates and the formula of dependent origination, and 
analyses them with different methods (Thit�t�ila 2010, xv–lxxi). It dedicates a 
whole section, the Satipat�t�hānavibhaṅga, to the four foundations of mindful-
ness. However, the text differs, to some extent, in its structure and content from 
the Satipat�t�hānasutta;75 it delineates the main areas of mindfulness and then 
analyses them according to the Abhidhamma, relating them to higher states 
of cognition.76 In the last and the largest book the Abhidhamma, the Pat�t�hāna, 
the entire dynamics of cognitive processes is discussed in the light of the for-
mula of interdependent origination. This is the most complete presentation of 
the interdependent conditionality, presented not through the twelve links but 
through twenty-four conditions, or modes of conditionality (paccaya), govern-
ing all the interrelated dhammas.77
To summarise, the Abhidhamma aims to identify, classify, characterise, and analyse 
all the constituents and conditions involved in Buddhist praxis, aiming for libera-
tion from suffering (dukkha), and one of those conditions is the presence of mind-
fulness. It is considered that meditation generates insight and understanding that 
all the processes and phenomena comprising lived experience are without a per-
manent intrinsic nature, and that ignorance and clinging to them create an illu-
sionary identity that is based on and perpetuates delusions and suffering (dukkha). 
71 The Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha lists at least eighteen wholesome mental constituents ( sobhanacetasika) 
which always occur together with mindfulnes; (cf. Bodhi 1993, 79).
72 The three characteristics are: impermanence (anicca), non-satisfactoriness (dukkha) and non-self 
(anattā).
73 MN III 245; SM II 32.
74 Dhs 125–79.
75 DN II 290–315; MN I 55–63.
76 Vibh 193–207.
77 This highly technical text is outside the scope of this paper; for an introduction to the text, see Ledi 
1986.
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One of the required conditions for liberation from suffering is wisdom (paññā), 
which in turn is conditioned by mindfulness and other ethical components. 
Conclusion
This paper defined the concept of mindfulness and presented its embedded na-
ture in the main models of Buddhist doctrine as portrayed in the Pāli Canon. 
It was shown that, on its own, mindfulness could not be presented as a method 
of self-observation but is considered one of the constituents or conditions in-
volved in cognitive processes, which, in conjunction with other (ethical) compo-
nents, creates appropriate circumstances for the generation of insight and wisdom 
(paññā). Since the basic presumption of Buddhism is that there is no intrinsic 
self, mindfulness cannot be interpreted as a kind of reference point or observer 
who witnesses phenomena and develops insights into the nature of experience. 
Buddhist meditation is primarily concerned with the nature (characterised by 
impermanence, no self, and non-satisfactoriness) and conditionality of cognitive 
processes; the cognition (citta) itself is also one of the momentary phenomena 
conditioning and being conditioned by these processes.
Mindfulness is regarded as a mental constituent that always appears only in the 
“good company” with other constituents and opens the door for wisdom (paññā) 
to enter on the path to awakening. With the presence of wisdom, which is equat-
ed with insight that there is no permanent person or observer, contemplation 
enters the level of dhammas, viewed to be beyond the conceptual level. In Pāli 
sources, such meditation practice is called bhāvanā, the term that may be rendered 
into English as “cultivation”, referring to cultivation of ethical mental states and 
the seven factors of awakening (bojjhaṅga).78 A well-established mindfulness is 
accompanied by other components such as joy and tranquillity; however, these 
are not presented as the goal of practice. As frequently reiterated in the Tipit�aka, 
the goal is the development of insight that all dhammas are empty of self (sabbe 
dhammā anattā),79 and this includes mindfulness, wisdom, the entire doctrine with 
its path and goals, and nibbāna. 
78 The seven factors of awakening are: mindfulness (sati); investigation of dhamma (dhammavicaya); 
energy (viriya); joy (pīti); tranquility (passaddhi); concentration (samādhi); equanimity (upekkhā). 
79 MN 1 230; AN I 286; S 3 133; Dhp 279.
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